At first, it would seem
as if Thomas is positing God's necessary communication of his own goodness
in the action of creation, as if God must create. But a close look at this
passage in its context reveals a different meaning. Thomas is describing
God's freely chosen supernatural communication of himself to his creatures.
Thomas begins the passage by speaking of God's communication of knowledge to
creatures, not the metaphysical communication of his similitude resulting in
creation. He then speaks of this sharing as free (gratia). But God
necessarily communicates knowledge of himself through the very act of
creating. So given that creation exists, God must share knowledge of
himself with those creatures. Every effect has a similitude of its cause.
Every agent produces its like. God cannot create and not share knowledge of
himself. The passage takes the existence of creatures as a starting point,
so the topic being discussed is not creation.
God does choose to share
another kind of knowledge of himself, a sharing that is free even given that
he chooses to create, and this is supernatural knowledge. It is appropriate
that Thomas should tackle this issue here, since much of this first lecture
of the In Divinis Nominibus (DN) has discussed Dionysius as a
biblical theologian. Thomas is describing the fittingness of God's
supernatural revelation, probably the public revelation handed on in
Scripture, but perhaps also God's self-communication to the mystics in their
contemplative experience. Thomas uses the same explanation for the
fittingness of supernatural revelation in ST, III, q. 1, a. 1. So
Thomas the theologian can point to a prime example of the first Good's
freely chosen self-diffusion.
Turning to the ST,
we again find a text, one both philosophical and theological, which expounds
elements of freedom in the communication of the good:
"For natural things have
a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it
if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread
abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that
every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It
pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as
possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to
the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
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likeness. Hence, if
natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to
others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by
likeness its own good to others as much as possible."
This article of q. 19
considers whether God wills things other than himself. Notice that Thomas
begins by speaking of the natural inclination of things. This is a kind of
umbrella under which he places the principle bonum diffusivum sui. A
careful reading of the first sentence brings this to the surface. Thomas
says that a natural thing has a natural inclination to acquire and rest in
the good, and it has a natural inclination to diffuse the good which is has
to others. This applies not only to God but to all beings. So everything
has a tendency to share the good that it has, yet this is not always a
necessary self-giving. So when Thomas says that it "pertains to the notion
of the will that it communicate the good which it has to others," one can
interpret "pertain" to mean that it is fitting for the will to communicate
the good, meaning it is fitting that the choice to communicate be made,
rather than that it be the nature of the will that it must communicate the
good, that it cannot choose to act or not to act. So contra
Kretzmann, it seems that ST, I, q.19, a.2 does not suggest necessary
diffusion in God's creative act.
Having seen this theme
of the inclination towards sharing the good, we are in a position to
understand a crucial move that Thomas makes in his doctrine of the good. He
places the principle bonum diffusivum sui under the doctrine of the
good as a final cause. This is evident in several texts, the first of which
is from the DV:
"[Objection] As can be
gathered from the words of Dionysius, good tends to pour out itself and
existence. A thing is good, therefore, by the fact that it is diffusive.
But to pour out or diffuse implies an action, and an action proceeds from
the essence through the mediation of a power. A thing is therefore said to
be good by reason of a power added to the essence, and so good really adds
something to being.
[Reply] Though,
according to the proper use of the word, to pour out seems to imply the
operation of an efficient cause, yet taken broadly it can imply the status
Page 823
of any cause, as do "to
influence," "to make," etc. When good is said to be of its very notion
diffusive, however, diffusion is not to be understood as implying the
operation of an efficient cause but rather the status of a final cause. Nor
is such diffusion brought about through the mediation of any added power.
Good expresses the diffusion of a final cause and not that of an agent, both
because the latter, as efficient, is not the measure and perfection of the
thing caused but rather its beginning, and also because the effect
participates in the efficient cause only in an assimilation of its form,
whereas a thing is dependent upon its end in its whole existence. It is in
this that the character of good was held to consist."
Thomas' restriction of
bonum diffusivum sui to the final cause harmonizes well with the
passages we considered from DN c. 1, lectio 1 and ST,
I, q. 19, a. 2, in which we could always find a certain inclination to share
the good, but not a necessary pouring forth of every good. Thomas'
explanation here gives those interpretations of the doctrine of the good a
firmer foundation in the theory of causality. We have already seen how
Thomas gives the notion of "perfective end" primacy in his definitions of
the good. Now, he places the concept of the good as self-communicative
under this primary definition, further removing the notion of necessity from
the good's self-diffusiveness. This is because an efficient or agent cause
is that whose action makes something exist, that which produces an effect.
If the good is identified primarily with this kind of cause, and the good is
diffusive of itself, then an efficient cause would be diffusive of itself,
would act necessarily, because communication would belong to the very nature
of the immediate principle of action. The objection only connects the good
with efficient causality, and
Page 824
therefore seems to
negate the status of the good as a transcendental, since it cannot be
predicated of any being unless the mediating accidental powers by which
finite beings act are present.
By placing the good
primarily under final causality, Thomas removes the sense of necessity in
self-communication. He can cite the notions of the good that he discussed
in the body of DV q.21, a.1, a passage we have already considered.
The good is perfective of the being's nature. The good is act, is being as
desired. These attributes can be predicated of efficient causality. But a
being's efficient causality is not its ultimate perfection, but rather that
by which it is perfected. Operation leads to perfection, and occurs through
efficient causality. But efficient causality is not itself absolutely
perfective of the subject, but the way to its highest perfection, its
highest good. The good is perfective of the whole being, while the
efficient cause is that through which the good is attained. Good is
predicated of final causality before efficient causality.
This classification of
the good under final causality is crucial, a teaching to which Thomas
returns in the SCG:
". . . in acting it [a
thing] diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of
a being's perfection that it 'can produce its like,' as may be seen from the
Philosopher in Meteorologica IV. Now, the nature of the good comes
from its being something appetible. This is the end, which also moves the
agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of itself
and of being."
The good is that for
which an agent acts, its end or purpose. Applying this passage about God's
goodness to creatures, we can say that the good's self-communication follows
from the fact that the end of creatures is only attained through action, and
action means the outpouring of goodness. Every action announces a
substance's existence, its substantial goodness, and communicates some kind
of accidental good as well, some accidental goodness or truth.
We can understand this
more deeply by looking to the principle that everything attracts its like.
If the good moves something, this means that the thing moved is itself
good. Hence, one good is moved to act in order to attain another good, to
attain something like itself. Every
Page 825
effect bears a likeness
of its cause, and so every action of a good thing moving towards another
good leads to effects which contain some good. Thus the (accidental)
goodness of a good thing is diffused as it acts for the sake of attaining
another good. Furthermore, as the outpouring of goodness is recognized as
the way to an ultimate good, this communication itself becomes an
intermediary end. This intermediary end is unique because for creatures it
is a necessary step toward the final cause. While human beings can freely
choose particular instances of sharing the good, every creature must diffuse
some goodness, as we have seen. Thus the diffusion of the good is a
necessary intermediary end for all creatures, meaning the outpouring of
accidental goodness is an intermediary end while the infinite good is the
ultimate end. Every good thing produces its like in order to attain its
like.
As a final consideration
of this important theme we can look at a brief passage from the ST:
"Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to
move."
The good moves as an end by drawing the subject towards perfection, towards
actuality. The good naturally attracts the subject. If the good is
diffusive as an end that moves, then the good draws the subject towards
operation and perfection, moves the subject to share its good in order to
attain the actualization of its accidental powers. The end is perfective
because it attracts an agent to itself by moving it to a diffusion of its
own goodness. The good as final cause and as diffusive of itself are
intimately connected, so that the principle bonum diffusivum sui is
by no means insignificant to the doctrine of the good as a perfective end.
Thus a passage which at first glance seems to empty the notion of the good
as self-diffusive and swallow it up into the notion of the good as an end
really retains a rich understanding of the good, especially when interpreted
in light of DV 21 and SCG, I, 37.
Let us summarize our
study of the good as self-diffusive in general. In considering the good as
act and active, we first saw that substantial esse requires action,
so that God necessarily acts intrinsically and creatures must act
extrinsically. Second, form was posited as inclined toward action, showing
that not all action is necessary, neither for God nor for creatures. Third,
created esse is for the sake of operation. We explicated the meaning
of this through a consideration of the metaphysical status of operative
potencies, especially the potencies of the human soul. A synthesis of this
doctrine with the inclination of form, the distinction between
Page 826
qualified and absolute
goodness in creatures, and the notion of intrinsic substantial form as the
principle of goodness for each creature led to a powerful implication in
Thomas' thought, that the inclination of form is based on its goodness that
pours itself forth towards absolute perfection that is not yet attained by
the really distinct operative potencies. These points allow us to conclude
that created esse is relational, is necessarily acting upon other
beings and being acted upon by them. Looking at the good as communicative,
Thomas maintained that God communicates himself most of all, and that this
is an intrinsic communication. Applying the hierarchy of being to our SS
passage, we recognized that the content communicated as well the ability and
inclination to communicate increase as we move up the great chain of being.
Such variety can also be found within the human species due to differences
in accidental perfection. Second, it was maintained that God's
communication ad extra is free, while creaturely communication ad
extra is necessary to an extent and, for intelligent creatures, in some
ways free. Finally, Thomas posits the inclination of a natural thing to
communicate the good so that this communication is fitting, meaning not
always necessary. In the last part, we saw that the doctrine of the good as
self-diffusive must be subordinated to the doctrine of the good as
perfective end, further removing the notion that the good must diffuse
itself in every case. Applying these insights to our overall question of
the relationality of esse, we can say that created esse not
only is relational, necessarily pouring itself out in extrinsic action, but
that this relationality intensifies as one moves up the hierarchy of being,
with an ever greater inclination and ability to share the good and
ever-greater goodness to share. However, contra Norris Clarke, we
have found no evidence to justify predicating "relationality" of the divine
esse. Rather, any outpouring of goodness from the divinity is free
precisely because of the internal, infinite diffusion of love and knowledge
already recognized in philosophy, a diffusion which theology recognizes as
interpersonal. The infinite goodness of God means that any action beyond
himself is gratuitous. Still, the issue of the creative act needs to be
considered more closely in order to determine the precise meaning and
application of the doctrine bonum diffusivum sui in Thomas.
Thomas Aquinas holds
that the principle bonum diffusivum sui applies to God and all to
creatures, to everything that has goodness, and uses the dictum to explain
God's creative activity.
Page 827
Keeping in mind the
objections that Clarke and Kretzmann have raised, let us begin by returning
to Thomas' discourse on God's goodness in SCG, I, 37:
"Moreover, the
communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This is evident
from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of
each thing is its act and perfection. Now each thing acts in so far as it
is in act, and in acting it diffuses being and goodness to other things.
Hence, it is a sign of a being's perfection that it 'can produce its like,'
as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV. Now, the
nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the
end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the
good is diffusive of itself and of being. But this diffusion befits God
because, as we have shown above, being through himself the necessary being,
God is the cause of being for other things. God is, therefore, truly good."
First, let us note that
the purpose of this chapter in the SCG is to prove that God is good.
The topic of creation comes up as a means to prove this truth. God's
goodness is shown by pointing to his role as cause of all being, which is to
say that he is the cause of every good, of all goodness found in creation.
Thomas proved earlier that all finite being must have an infinite being as
its cause, must result from a diffusion from that unlimited being. The
first sentence of our passage posited this diffusion as belonging to
goodness itself. Hence God is good.
But the diffusion of
goodness through creation is not assumed as if God created necessarily.
Thomas begins by stating that the communication of being and goodness
proceeds from goodness, not that the communication of goodness in creation
must proceed from God. This is because there is (philosophically
speaking) only one communication in the divinity that is necessary, God's
communicating his goodness in himself, God's willing and understanding
himself. Theology recognizes that this self-communication includes the
generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit. It follows that
the self-communication posited in philosophy
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Page 4
DV, q. 21, a. 1, obj. 4 & ad 4 ([Objection 4] Praeterea, ut
potest accipi ex dictis Dionysii in IV cap. De divinis nominibus,
bonum est diffusivum sui et esse, ergo per hoc est aliquid bonum per
quod est diffusivum; sed diffundere importat actionem quandam; actio
autem ab essentia procedit mediante virtute; ergo aliquid dicitur esse
bonum ratione virtutis superadditae ad essentiam: et sic bonum addit
aliquid realiter super ens. [Thomas' Answer] Ad quartum dicendum quod
diffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare
operationem causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare
habitudinem cuiuscumque causae, sicut influere et facere et alia
huiusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum sit diffusivum secundum sui
rationem, non est intelligenda diffusio secundum quod importat
operationem causae efficientis sed secundum quod importat habitudinem
causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute
superaddita; dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis et non causae
agentis, tum quia efficiens in quantum huiusmodi non est rei mensura et
perfectio sed magis initium, tum etiam quia effectus participat causam
efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum, sed finem consequitur
res secundum totum esse suum; et in hoc consistebat ratio boni.).
